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1. Introduction
This paper provides an introduction to the theory of contests in a unied frame-
work. In particular we present the basic model and study its main properties from
which we derive various applications. The literature on this topic is vast and we
make no attempt to cover all issues. Therefore many good papers and interesting
topics are not covered. The interested reader can consult the surveys of Nitzan
(1994) and Konrad (2006) for additional issues and references.
A part of economics (e.g. general equilibrium) studies situations where prop-
erty rights are well dened and agents voluntarily trade rights over goods or pro-
duce rights for new goods. This approach has produced very important insights
into the role of markets in resource allocation such as the existence and e¢ ciency
of competitive equilibrium, the optimal specialization under international trade,
the role of prices in providing information to the agents, etc.
There are other situations, though, where agents do not trade but rather ght
over property rights. In these situations agents can inuence the outcome of
the process by means of certain actions such as investment in weapons, bribing
judges/politicians, hiring lawyers, etc. These situations are called Contests. The
literature has developed from the seminal contributions by Tullock (1967, 1980)
and Krueger (1974) who studied a specic contest, rent-seeking, and Becker (1984)
who studied lobbying.2 Lately, the framework was generalized to other situations.
The example below refers to voting. Other examples are considered later on.
Example 1.1. Political Competition: Two political parties value o¢ ce in
V1 and V2. To inuence voters they use advertisement in quantities G1 and G2:
2See Tullock (2003) for his account of the development of the concept.
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The probability that party i = 1; 2 reaches o¢ ce, denoted by pi is
pi =
Gi
G1 +G2
if G1 +G2 > 0, (1.1)
pi = 1=2 if G1 +G2 = 0:
Expected monetary payments for party i = 1; 2 are,
Gi
G1 +G2
Vi  Gi:
A Contest is dened by the following elements:3
- A (nite) set of agents, also called contenders, denoted by N = f1; 2; :::; ng.
- A set of possible actions (e¤ort, investments) taken by agents before the prize
is allocated. These actions determine the probability of obtaining the prize. They
can be interpreted as the positions taken by agents before the conict starts.
- A prize whose quantity may depend on the actions taken by agents.4
- A function, relating the actions taken by agents to the probabilities that they
obtain the prize. This function is called Contest Success Function.
- A function that for each possible action yields the cost of this action. This
function is called the cost function.5
Formally, let pi = pi(G1; ::::; Gn) be the probability that agent i obtains the
prize when actions are (G1; ::::; Gn) 2 <n+. Another interpretation is that pi is the
3For a discussion of the concept of contest see Neary (1997) and Hausken (2005).
4This may be due to the fact that agents value the e¤ort made in the contest or because the
investment increases the value of the prize, see Chung (1996) and Amegashie (1999).
5We assume implicitly that should expenses be publicly disclosed, contenders su¤er no con-
sequences. See Corchón (2000) for the case in which contenders can be legally prosecuted for
accepting these expenses.
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fraction of the prize obtained by i. Vi(G1; ::::; Gn) is the value of the prize as a
function of the e¤orts made by agents and Ci(Gi) is the cost attributed by i to
her action Gi. If the valuations of the prize are independent of e¤orts they will
be denoted by Vi and when they are identical for all agents, by V: Assuming that
agents are risk-neutral with payo¤s linear on the expected prize and costs, the
payo¤ function of agent i; denoted by i( ); is
i(G1; ::; Gi; ::; Gn)  pi(G1; ::; Gi; ::; Gn)Vi(G1; ::; Gi; ::; Gn)  Ci(Gi):
Thus, the denition of a contest has lead us to a game in normal form where
payo¤s are expected utilities and strategies are e¤orts/investments. For these
games the less controversial concept of equilibrium is the one proposed by John
Nash in 1950, generalizing an idea advanced in 1838 by Antoine-Agustin Cournot:
An equilibrium is a situation from which there are no unilateral incentives to
deviate. Formally, we say that (G1; ::G

i ::; G

n) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if
i((G

1; ::; G

i ; ::; G

n)  i(G1; ::; Gi; ::; Gn); for all Gi 2 <+, for each agent i:
Now consider some more examples:
Example 1.2: Litigation/Fight. In this case Vis represent the value at-
tached to some item, say, a piece of land, a state or a title of nobility. If the
ght is conducted in the legal system Gs are legal expenses. If the ght is a war,
Gs are costs of raising an army. Gs could also be sabotage activities devoted
to decreasing the e¢ ciency of the opponent (Konrad [2000]). The contest success
function yields the probability of obtaining the item as a function of legal/military
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expenses or sabotage activities.
Example 1.3: Lobbying. In this case Vis represent the value of a public
policy like a law granting certain rights to some citizens, subsidies to agriculture
or restrictions to enter a market, etc. The set of feasible policies is the interval
[0; 1]. There are two agents that have opposite preferences over this issue (right
and left, farmers and tax-payers, incumbent and entrant). pi is the position taken
on this issue and pi Vi is the payo¤ derived by i from this allocation.
Example 1.4: Awarding a prize. In this case Vis represent the value of
a grant, a prize or a patent. Gs are the expenses made in order to participate
and/or to inuence the jury for a prize. The contest success function yields the
probability of obtaining the prize as a function of e¤orts/expenses made in order
to obtain merits/inuence in the jurys eyes.
Example 1.5: Contracts. In this case, Vis are the value of a contract for
the public or the private sector or the value of hosting a public event, i.e. the
Olympic Games. Expenses are made in order to present the case of each contender
and/or to inuence the jury. The contest success function yields the probability of
obtaining the contract or the right to organize the event as a function of expenses.
Example 1.6: Cooperative production. The agents have preferences over
pairs consumption/labor. Here V ( ) is the production function, Gi is the labor i
and pi(G1; ::::; Gn) is the share of i in the output. Thus piV is is consumption.
In the following sections we will review several aspects of contests paying
attention to both analytical results and applications.
Section 2 is concerned with the foundations of the success contest function.
The basic properties of equilibrium, existence, uniqueness and comparative
statics, are amenable to a common analysis that encompasses Examples 1.1-1.5
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above. Such an analysis is performed in Section 3, where we study the symmetric
case and Section 4 where we are concerned with asymmetric contests.
Section 5 examines socially optimal policies under rent-seeking in well known
problems; welfare losses due to monopoly and transaction costs as well as the
impact of regulation. These problems correspond to Examples 1.2-3 above where
the contest does not produce anything valuable for society.
In Section 6 we study the optimal design of a contest that produces something
socially useful. This corresponds to Examples 1.4-5 above. A planner concerned
with social welfare will simply stop many contests belonging to the class considered
in Section 5, e.g. the ght for monopoly rights. On the contrary, the same planner,
may subsidize many belonging to the second, e.g. R&D, etc.
2. Contest Success Functions
In this section we study the properties of contest success functions (CSF).
In order to be specic about the properties of an NE, it would be nice to have
an idea of the form of CSF. Consider the following functional form:
pi =
(Gi)Pn
j=1 (Gj)
if
nX
j=1
(Gj) > 0, (2.1)
pi =
1
n
otherwise: (2.2)
An intuitive interpretation of (2.1) is that (Gi) measures the impact of Gi in
the contest, i.e. it summarizes the merits of i: Thus, in Example 1.1, (Gi) = Gi
is the impact of advertisement on voters. The ratio (Gi)=
Pn
j=1 (Gj) measures
the relative impact (merit) of i: Hence, (2.1) says that the probability of an agent
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winning the prize equals the relative impact (merit) of that agent. Many papers
dealing with contest models in the literature assume a CSF which is a special case
of (2.1). For instance (Gi) = Gi which was introduced by Tullock (1980). If
 = 1 we have the form considered in (1.1). If  = 0; the probability of success is
independent of the e¤ort made by the players. Another example is the logit form
proposed by Hirshleifer (1989) where, given a positive scalar k, (Gi) = ekGi.
Whenever the form (2.1) is postulated, the following properties are assumed.
i) ( ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable in <++.
ii) ( ) is concave.
iii) 0( ) > 0.
iv) (0) = 0; limGi!1 (Gi) =1:
v) Gi0(Gi)=(Gi) is bounded for all Gi 2 <+.6
Property ii) is helpful in the proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium. iii)
says that more e¤ort by i increases the merit of i. The last two properties are
technical. If (Gi) = Gi with 0 <   1 all the above properties are fullled.
Let us present CSFs which are not special cases of the form (2.1). The rst two
consider the case of two contestants and build on the idea that only di¤erences in
e¤ort matter. Baik (1998) proposed the following: Given a positive scalar ,
p1 = p1(G1  G2) and p2 = 1  p1. (2.3)
Che and Gale (2000) postulate a special form of p1( ):
p1 = max

min

1
2
+ (G1  G2); 1

; 0

and p2 = 1  p1. (2.4)
6When no confusion can arise, derivatives will be denoted by primes.
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These CSF are problematic because the winning probabilities depend on the units
in which expenditures are measured (e.g. dollars or cents), see our discussion
of property (H) later in this section. Alcalde and Dahm (2007) proposed the
following CSF that circumvents this di¢ culty; Given a positive scalar , suppose
for simplicity that Gj  Gj+1. Then,
pi =
nX
j=i
Gj  Gj+1
j G1
, for i = 1; :::; n with Gn+1 = 0. (2.5)
2.1. Axiomatics
Suppose that pi( ) is dened for all subsets ofN . Consider the following properties:
(P1) Imperfect Discrimination: For all i, if Gi > 0, then pi > 0.7
(P2) Monotonicity: For all i, pi is increasing in Gi and decreasing in Gj; j 6= i.
(P3) Anonymity: For any permutation function  on the set of bidders we have
p(G) = p(G) for all G  (G1; ::; Gi; ::; Gn).
While these properties are standard, the next two properties are more specic
and relate winning probabilities in contests to di¤erent sets of active contestants.
Let pMi (G) be contestant is probability of winning a contest played by a subset
M  N of contestants with G  (G1; ::; Gi; ::; Gn).
(P4) Independence: For all i 2M , pMi (G) is independent of Gj for all j =2M .
7The name of this axiom refers to the fact that a contest can be interpreted as an auction
where the prize is auctioned among the agents and e¤orts are bids. In standard auctions the
higher bid obtains the prize with probability one. Here, any positive bid entitles the bidder
with a positive probability to obtain the object, so it is as if the bidding mechanism did not
discriminate perfectly among bids.
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(P5) Consistency: For all i 2M , and for allM  N with at least two elements,
pMi (G) =
pi(G)P
j2M pj(G)
; for all G  (G1; ::; Gi; ::; Gn).
Together (P4) and (P5) imply that the CSF satises Luces Choice Axiom (Clark
and Riis (1998)) dened as follows: the probability that contestant i wins if player
k does not participate is equal to the probability that i wins when k participates
given that k does not win. This axiom holds for any subset of non-participating
players. This is a kind of independence of irrelevant alternatives property.
Skaperdas (1996) proved the following result whose proof is omitted:
Proposition 2.1: (P1)(P5) are equivalent to assuming a CSF like (2.1).
Properties (P1)-(P4) are reasonable. However, (P5) is debatable, as shown by
the next example:
Example 2.1: There are three teams that play a soccer/basketball league.
Teams have to play against each other twice. They obtain three, one or zero
points if they win, draw or lose, respectively. Suppose e¤orts made by teams are
given. There are two states of the world where each occurs with probability .5.
In the rst state results are:
Team 1 against Team 2: 1 obtains 4 points and 2 obtains 1 point.
Team 1 against Team 3: 1 obtains 0 points and 3 obtains 6 points.
Team 2 against Team 3: 2 obtains 6 points and 3 obtains 0 points.
In this state of the world Team 2 wins the league because it gets 7 points.
Teams 3 and 1 get 6 and 4 points respectively.
In the second state of the world results are identical except for the following:
Team 1 against Team 3: 1 obtains 6 points and 3 obtains 0 points.
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In this state of the world Team 1 wins the league because it gets 10 points.
Teams 2 and 3 obtain 7 and 0 points respectively.
Hence, the probability that Team 1 wins the league is .5. However if Team
3 does not play and the results of each match are independent Team 1 wins the
league with probability 1. Thus we see that the ratio of probabilities of success
between Teams 1 and 2 are altered when Team 3 does not play the league.
We now consider the following homogeneity property:
(H) 8i 2 N , pi( ) is homogeneous of degree zero, i.e. pi(G) = pi(G), 8 > 0.
(H) says that the probability of obtaining the prize is independent of units of
measurement -i.e. whether e¤ort is measured in hours or minutes, or investments
in dollars or euros. If e¤ort means attention or work quality, the interpretation is
less clear. The forms (2.1) with i = G

i and (2.5) fulll (H). The form (2.1) with
the logit specication, (2.3) and (2.4) do not fulll (H).
Skaperdas (1996) proved that (P1)-(P5) and (H) imply the form (2.1) with
(G) = G,   0: An unpleasant implication of (H) is that if pi( ) is continuous
in (0; 0; :::; 0), pi( ) is constant (Corchón [2000]) which contradicts (P2). Thus
under (H), pi( ) is discontinuous. Skaperdas (1996) also studied the logit form: He
showed that this form is equivalent to (P1)-(P5) plus an additional property that
says that the probability of success of a player only depends on the di¤erence in
the e¤ort of players. Clark and Riis (1998) extended Skaperdasresults dropping
the anonymity assumption.
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2.2. Other Foundations
Hillman and Riley (1989) o¤er a model of the political process where the impact
of e¤ort is uncertain. They derive a CSF of the form (Gi) = Gi only for the
case of two contestants. Fullerton and McAfee (1999) and Baye and Hoppe (2003)
o¤er micro-foundations for a subset of CSFs of the form (Gi) = Gi for innovation
tournaments and patent races. Finally, Corchón and Dahm (2007) derive arbitrary
CSF for the case of two contentands who have incomplete information about the
type of the contest administrator. They argue that with three or more players, the
form (2.1) is not likely to occur. Here uncertainty comes from the fact that the
decision-maker can be of multiple types, and in the other models it comes from
the actions of the contestants. Corchón and Dahm also interpret CSF as sharing
rules and establish a connection to bargaining and claims problems. They prove
that a generalization of the class of CSF given in (2.1) can be understood as the
weighted Nash bargaining solution where e¤orts are the weights of the agents.
3. Symmetric Contests
From now on, unless stated otherwise, we keep the functional form (2.1) plus the
properties i)-v) stated there. We assume that the cost function Ci : <+ ! <+ is
twice continuously di¤erentiable, convex, strictly increasing with Ci(0) = 0 and
C 0i bounded: Notice that these assumptions are similar to those made about p( ).
Now we present the following assumption:
Assumption 1: a) All agents have the same cost function C( ).
b) V = V0 + a
Pn
j=1 (Gj); V0 > 0; a  0.
c) There exist (y; ) such that, for all y > y; a0(y)  C 0(y) <  < 0:
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The interpretation of part b) of Assumption 1 (A1 in the sequel ) is that i val-
ues the prize for two reasons. An intrinsic component V0 and another component
reecting aggregate merit. The parameter a is the marginal rate of substitution
between aggregate merit and intrinsic value of the prize. The case where merits
do not add value to the prize corresponds to a = 0. Part c) of A1 implies that
when e¤ort is very large, the ratio C 0=0 is larger than a. The reason for this
assumption is that if a or the marginal impact of the action (0) is large or the
marginal cost of the action is small, there are incentives to increase the e¤ort
without limit. This assumption eliminates that possibility.
3.1. Existence, Uniqueness and Comparative Statics
We are now ready to prove our rst result:
Proposition 3.1: Under A1, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium. This equi-
librium is symmetric.
Proof: Assuming interiority, rst order conditions of payo¤maximization are,
@i
@Gi
= a0(Gi)
(Gi)Pn
j=1 (Gj)
+ (V0 + a
nX
j=1
(Gj))
0(Gi)
P
r 6=i (Gr)
(
Pn
j=1 (Gj))
2
  C 0(Gi) = 0;
or, V0
0(Gi)
P
r 6=i (Gr)
(
Pn
j=1 (Gj))
2
= C 0(Gi)  a0(Gi); i = 1; 2; :::; n: (3.1)
The second order condition is fullled because (3.1) can be written as
@i
@Gi
= V0
0(Gi)
P
r 6=i (Gr)
(
Pn
j=1 (Gj))
2
  C 0(Gi) + a0(Gi);
and all terms in the right hand side of the equation are decreasing in Gi; hence
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@2i
@G2i
 0: This implies that (3.1) corresponds to a maximum. Therefore the
existence of a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to showing that the system (3.1) has
a solution. We rst prove that such a system can only have symmetric solutions.
Let Gi = minr2N Gr and Gj = maxr2N Gr: If the solution is not symmetric,
Gi < Gj: Since the right hand side of (3.1) is increasing in Gi; we have that,
V0
0(Gi)
P
r 6=i (Gr)
(
Pn
j=1 (Gj))
2
= C 0(Gi) a0(Gi)  C 0(Gj) a0(Gj) = V0
0(Gj)
P
r 6=j (Gr)
(
Pn
j=1 (Gj))
2
:
Also, since ( ) is concave, 0(Gj)  0(Gi): Hence the previous equation impliesP
r 6=i (Gr) 
P
r 6=j (Gr); which in turn implies Gi  Gj; a contradiction.
Let y  Gi; i = 1; 2; :::; n: Now (3.1) can be written as
0(y)(a+ V0
n  1
(y)n2
)  C 0(y) = 0: (3.2)
Let the left hand side of (3.2) be denoted by 	(y): If y ! 0, 	(y) > 0, and if
y !1, A1c) and property iv) of () imply 	(y) < 0: Therefore the mean value
theorem implies that (3.1) has a solution that -by the previous reasonings- is a
Nash Equilibrium. Since 	( ) is strictly decreasing equilibrium is unique.
Lastly let us consider the case in which the rst order condition does not hold
with equality, i.e. Gk = 0 and G

i > 0 for some k and i: In this case, from (3.1),
the concavity of ( ) and the convexity of C( ) we have that
0  0(0)(V0
P
r 6=k (Gr)Pn
j=1 (Gj))
2
+ a)  C 0(0)  0(Gi)(V0
P
r 6=k (Gr)
(
Pn
j=1 (Gj))
2
+ a)  C 0(Gi)
> 0(Gi)(V0
P
r 6=i (Gr)
(
Pn
j=1 (Gj))
2
+ a)  C 0(Gi) = 0 (since
X
r 6=k
(Gr) >
X
r 6=i
(Gr)).
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To end the proof notice that Gi = 0, 8i is impossible because if an agent increases
e¤ort by a small quantity, she wins the prize at a cost as close to zero as we wish
(because C(0) = 0 and C( ) is continuous). Thus, this situation cannot be an
equilibrium.
The previous result was obtained by Nti (1997) assuming a = 0 and Ci(Gi) =
Gi: Szidarovsky and Okuguchi (1997) generalized this result considering a CSF
like
pi =
i(Gi)Pn
j=1 j(Gj)
when
nX
j=1
j(Gj) > 0 and pi =
1
n
otherwise; (3.3)
where each i( ) fulls the properties attributed to ( ) in Section 2. Notice that
the form (2.1) is a special case of (3.3). The next section is devoted to study
asymmetric contests.
Example 3.1: Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) studied the case in which
i = G

i allowing for  > 1, i.e. ( ) is not necessarily concave: If   1; a = 0
and C(Gi) = cGi, from (3.2) we can derive an explicit formula for the equilibrium
value of the e¤ort and payo¤s, namely
Gi =
(n  1)V
n2c
and i =
V (n  (n  1))
n2
:
The aggregate cost of e¤ort is cny = (n  1)V=n: Notice that the aggregate cost
of e¤ort increases with n and if n is not small it is, approximately, V: In the case
studied by Tullock (1980), i.e.  = 1, this amounts to V , i.e. rents are dissipated
because the value of the prize equals the aggregate value of e¤orts.8 We will see
8Rent dissipation also assumes that e¤orts are completely wasted and that they have a
14
that this fact has important consequences for social welfare.
Let us now concentrate on comparative statics. First, we notice that our game
can be transformed into an aggregative game (Corchón (1994)) in which payo¤s
of each player depend on the strategy of this player and the sum of all strategies.
Indeed, since payo¤s for i are
(Gi)Pn
j=1 (Gj)
(V0 + a
nX
j=1
(Gj))  Ci(Gi)
setting xi  (Gi) the previous expression can be written as
xiPn
j=1 xj
(V0 + a
nX
j=1
xj)  Ci( 1(xi))  i(xi;
nX
j=1
xj):
9
Unfortunately, results obtained in this class of games are non applicable here.
The reason is that they require monotonic best reply functions: either decreasing
-i.e. strategic substitution, Corchón (1994)- or increasing -i.e. strategic com-
plementarity, Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Amir (1996).10 But
in Example 1.1 we see that if Ci = Gi, V1 = V2 = 1; the best reply of i is
Gi =
p
Gj   Gj, which is neither increasing, nor decreasing. Thus, there is no
hope that in the general case such properties hold. Fortunately, our symmetry
assumption allows us to obtain comparative statics results.
positive opportunity cost. When the action of rent-seekers increases the utility of someone else
-e.g. bribes- rents are said to be transferred.
9Notice that this payo¤ function is identical to a prot function in which inverse demand
reads V0Pn
j=1 xj
+ a and the cost function is Ci(
 1(xi)) (Szidarovsky y Okuguchi (1997)).
10The concepts of strategic substitution and complementarity are due to Bulow, Geanakoplos
and Klemperer (1985).
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Proposition 3.2: Under A1, the value of e¤ort/investment in the Nash equi-
librium is strictly increasing in a and V0 and strictly decreasing in n.
Proof: Write (3.2) as
0 = 0(y)(a+ V0
n  1
(y)n2
)  C 0(y)  	(y; a; n; V0): (3.4)
where as we noticed before, @	
@y
< 0: Di¤erentiating implicitly (3.4),
dy
da
=
@	
@a
 @	
@y
=
0
 @	
@y
> 0:
A similar argument proves that dy
dV0
> 0: Finally, writing (3.2) as follows
V0
n  1
n2
= (
C 0(y)
0(y)
  a)(y),
we see that the left hand side is strictly decreasing in n and the right hand side is
strictly increasing in y. Therefore, y and n vary in opposite directions and, thus,
y is strictly decreasing in n:
The previous result generalizes Nti (1997) to the case of a > 0 and non linear
cost functions.
3.2. The Choice Between Productive and Contest Activities
So far we have assumed that the number of contenders is given. A possible mecha-
nism for determining n is to assume that agents have the choice of either entering
into a contest or performing a productive activity (Krueger [1974]). Assume for
simplicity that the productive activity yields a net return of ; with   V , that
16
each contender regards as given. Under the assumptions made in Example 3.1
above, the payo¤ of a potential contender is V (n   (n   1))=n2. Free entry in
both activities equalizes net returns and yields the equilibrium number of con-
tenders, namely
n =
V (1  ) +p(1  )2V 2 + 4V
2
:
The condition V   guarantees that n  1. As intuition suggests, the number
of contenders depends positively on the value of the prize and negatively on the
productivity of the productive sector which is a measure of the opportunity cost
of participating in the contest.
An application of the above mechanism is that if a positive shock increases
the supply of productive activities such that  falls, rent-seeking is fostered. For
instance if the supply of a natural resource increases, this is, in principle, good
news because the economy now has more resources. However, the e¤ect of this
positive shock on social welfare is ambiguous because the increase in the supply of
productive activities is matched by an increase in wasteful expenditure of the rent-
seeking sector since these expenditures are increasing in n. Under some conditions,
the second e¤ect prevails (Baland and Francois, [2000] and Torvik [2002]) giving
rise to the so-called Dutch disease.11
11The term originated as follows: In the 1960´s the discovery of large reserves of gas in the
North Sea raised the value of the Dutch currency. This increased imports and decreased exports
negatively a¤ecting the domestic industry. The use of the term was generalized later on to
describe negative e¤ects on real variables -GDP, etc.- of an increase in natural resources. It has
also been translated to political science where the term Political Dutch Diseaserefers to the
correlation between the size of oil reserves and the degree of authoritarianism.
17
4. Asymmetric Contests
In this section we study the case in which agents are di¤erent and, in general,
Nash equilibrium is not symmetric. The reason for studying this case, other than
increasing generality, is that there are situations that can only occur in asymmetric
contests. For instance:
1) Some agents might make zero e¤ort in equilibrium, i.e. be inactive. Agents
whose e¤ort is positive in equilibrium will be called active.12
2) Agents with higher valuations/lower costs may obtain the prize with higher
probability than the rest. This implies that in some cases -like the procurement
example in Section 1- there is a positive relationship between rent-seeking and
e¢ ciency, a point to recall when discussing the social desirability of contests.
3) Some agents may be better o¤ as a consequence of the contest. In a sym-
metric contest all contenders are better o¤ if the contest is banished since they
incur a positive cost simply to maintain the probability of obtaining the prize.
4.1. Basic Properties of the Model
In order to concentrate on the issues raised by asymmetries we will assume in this
section that the value of the prize does not depend on e¤orts, that is  = 0. Let
us start by assuming that the CSF is of the form (3.3). Then,
i =
i(Gi)Pn
j=1 j(Gj)
Vi   ci(Gi):
12If ( ) is not concave, Nash equilibrium may entail non active agents even under symmetry
assumptions, see Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992).
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Set yi  i(Gi). Since i( ) is strictly increasing, it can be inverted. Set
ci(
 1(yi))  Qi(yi): Then,
i =
yiPn
j=1 yj
Vi   ci( 1(yi)) = yiPn
j=1 yj
Vi  Qi(yi)
By a well-known result, NE are independent of linear transformations in payo¤s.
Dividing the previous expression by Vi and setting
Qi(yi)
Vi
 Ki(yi), payo¤s are now
yiPn
j=1 yj
  Qi(yi)
Vi
=
yiPn
j=1 yj
 Ki(yi)
Thus, under (3.3) lack of symmetry in the contest success function can be trans-
lated to lack of symmetry in the cost function.
In the next result we will assume that the functions Ki( )s are linear, see
Cornes and Hartley (2005) for the non linear case.
Assumption 2: Ki(yi) = diyi; di > 0; 8i 2 N:
Notice that because  = 0, A2 implies A1c). Without loss of generality set
d1  d2  ::::  dn. There are two interpretations of A2. In the rst one the CSF
is (Gi) = Gi and agents have di¤erent costs/valuations reected in di¤erent ds.
In this case, yi = Gi and di = ci=Vi (see Hillman and Riley [1989]): In the second
interpretation, the contest success function is a special case of the one proposed
by Gradstein (1995), namely
pi =
qi(Gi)Pn
j=1 qj(Gj)
if
nX
j=1
qj(Gj) > 0
pi = qi if
nX
j=1
(Gj) = 0: (4.1)
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where qi can be interpreted as the prior probability that agent i wins the prize.
Assume that (Gi) = Gi and agents are identical in costs and valuations. Denoting
the marginal cost of e¤ort by c we have that di = cV qi and Gi =
yi
qi
.
Proposition 4.1: Under A2 and (3.3) there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
There is an m  n such that all agents i = 1; :::;m with Pmj=1 dj > di(m  1) are
active and all agents i = m+ 1; :::; n with
Pm
j=1 dj  di(m  1) are not active.
Proof: First notice that the set of agents for which
Pm
j=1 dj > di(m   1)
has no holes, i.e. if agent k belongs to this set, agent k   1 also belongs sincePm
j=1 dj > dk(m  1) > dk 1(m  1); given that dk 1 < dk:
Consider the following algorithm that begins with agent n and continues in
decreasing order. If
Pk
j=1 dj  dk(k   1); we go to agent k   1. If
Pk
j=1 dj >
dk(k   1), the algorithm stops and yields m = k. The algorithm stops before
k = 1 because for k = 2; d1 + d2 > d2: As we will see, this algorithm identies
active agents.
First order conditions of payo¤ maximization for i = 1; :::;m are
@i
@yi
=
P
j 6=i yj
(
Pm
j=1 yj)
2
  di = 0; or
P
j 6=i yj
(
Pm
j=1 yj)
2
= di: (4.2)
It is easy to see that @i
@yi
is decreasing in yi. Thus second order conditions hold.
Adding up (4.2) over 1 tom, we have that (m 1)Pmj=1 yj = (Pmj=1 yj)2Pmj=1 dj:
From there and (4.2) again we get that
yi =
m  1Pm
j=1 dj
(1  di(m  1)Pm
j=1 dj
); i = 1; :::;m: (4.3)
which yields the e¤ort of active agents. Notice that yi > 0 because i belongs to
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the set for which
Pk
j=1 dj > dk(k   1). For any other agent, say r the marginal
payo¤ evaluated in yr = 0 is
@r
@yr
=
Pm
j=1 yj
(
Pm
j=1 yj)
2
  dr =
Pm
j=1 dj
m  1   dr  0: (4.4)
Thus, yr = 0 is the optimal action of this agent.
We will now prove that the previous equilibrium is unique. Let us consider an
arbitrary equilibrium. The rst order condition is,
@i
@yi
=
P
j 6=i y

j
(
Pn
j=1 y

j )
2
  di  0 and if strict inequality holds, yi = 0:
Let M  N be the set of active agents. For i 2M , we have thatP
j 6=i y

j
(
Pn
j=1 y

j )
2
= di =
Pn
j=1 y

j   yi
(
Pn
j=1 y

j )
2
:
Again, we see that the set of active agents cannot have holes because if i is
active and h is such that dh < di and yh = 0, we hadPn
j=1 y

j   yi
(
Pn
j=1 y

j )
2
= di > dh 
Pn
j=1 y

j
(
Pn
j=1 y

j )
2
which is impossible. Suppose now that there are two equilibria. In the rst, agents
1 to k are active and in the second, agents 1 to h are active, with h > k. Thus
agent h is not active in the rst equilibrium but is active in the second. By the
previous reasonings this implies
Pk
j=1 dj
k   1   dh  0 and
Ph
j=1 dj
h  1   dh > 0)
Ph
j=k+1 dj
h  k > dh;
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which is impossible because if agents are ordered in such a way that di  di+1; dh
is larger than the average of d0s from dk+1 to dh: Thus k = m:
Under the rst interpretation, recall that yi = Gi and di = ci=Vi. Thus, from
(4.3) and the form of the contest success function used here,
Gi =
m  1Pm
j=1 cj=Vj
(1  ci(m  1)
Vi
Pm
j=1 cj=Vj
); pi =
GiPn
j=1G

j
= 1  ci(m  1)
Vi
Pm
j=1 cj=Vj
(4.5)
Thus, agents who are more e¢ cient (i.e. with lower cs, or larger V s) make more
e¤ort and have a greater probability of getting the prize than ine¢ cient agents.13
Suppose n = 2 and c1 = c2 = 1. Expected payo¤s for contender 1 in equilib-
rium are V
3
1
(
P2
j=1 Vj)
2 : Since expected payo¤s under no contest are V1=2 the former
are larger than the latter i¤ V1 > V2(1 +
p
2). In this case the player who values
the prize the most is better o¤ as a consequence of the contest.
Under the second interpretation, recall that di = c=(V qi) and Gi = yi=qi Thus,
from (4.3) and the form of the contest success function used here,
Gi =
V (m  1)
cqi
Pm
j=1 1=qj
(1  1=qi(m  1)Pm
j=1 1=qj
); pi =
qiG

iPn
j=1 qjG

j
= 1  1=qi(m  1)Pm
j=1 1=qj
: (4.6)
Thus, more optimistic agents, (i.e. agents with large qis) make less e¤ort and
have a greater probability of getting the prize than pessimistic agents (i.e. those
with small qis).14
If n = 2, Gi =
q1q2V
c
; i = 1; 2, i.e. Nash equilibrium is symmetric despite the
fact that the contest success function is not. Moreover, pi =
1=qjP2
j=1 1=qj
= qi, i.e.
13The equilibrium values of G0is and p
0
is depend on the ratio ci=Vi and the harmonic mean of
the ratios of cost/valuations dened as mPm
j=1 ci=Vj
:
14Here, equilibrium values of G0is and p
0
is depend on the harmonic mean of qis.
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prior and posterior probabilities coincide. We now study whether this result is gen-
eralizable to more general contest success function. Write pi = pi(G1; G2; q1; q2):
Assume a property that we discussed in Section 2, namely that pi(; ; q1; q2) is ho-
mogeneous of degree zero in (G1; G2) and let ds be as in the rst interpretation:
Proposition 4.2: Under H, n = 2 and A.2, G1 = G

2 i¤ d1 = d2.
Proof: Consider rst order conditions of payo¤ maximization for i = 1; 2:
@pi
@Gi
Vi   ci = 0, @p1
@G1
  d1 = 0 = @p2
@G2
  d2
From H, and p1 = 1  p2 we get that
@p1
@G1
G1 +
@p1
@G2
G2 =
@p1
@G1
G1  
@p2
@G2
G2 = 0
From these two equations we obtain G1d1 = G

2d2 and hence the result.
Thus, if cost functions and valuations are identical for the two contenders,
they make the same e¤ort in the contest regardless of their priors or any other
factor a¤ecting the contest success function. Under the additional assumption
that pi > qi i¤G1 > G2 (an assumption fullled by (2.1)) the previous argument
shows that p1 = q1 i¤ d1 = d2, see Corchón 2000.
15 Unfortunately, this result is
not generalizable to games with more than two players. Recall that
pi = 1 
1=qi(m  1)Pm
j=1 1=qj
:
For instance, assuming n = 3 and q = (:375; :375; :25); p = (:43; :43; :14), i.e.
15In this paper it is shown that the conditions of Proposition 4.2 plus some mild requirements
guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium for n = 2.
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prior and posterior probabilities do not coincide. However, from the formula
above, we see that the ranking of prior and posterior probabilities is the same. In
Corchón (2000) it is shown that this property holds in more general models. See
Gradstein (1995), Baik (1998), Nti (1999) and Fang (2002) for further study of
comparative statics when contest success functions are not symmetric.
4.2. Contests Between Groups
So far we have assumed that individual agents are the actors in the contests. But
many times actors are associations of individuals who share a common objective,
e.g. a law protecting the environment, a certain public decision, etc. In such a
case the well-known free rider problem raises its ugly head: each member of the
group will attempt to shift painful duties -e¤ort, contributions- to other members
in the same group. In some cases the group might be able to maintain discipline
and enforce the optimal policy by means of punishments, ostracism, etc. But, in
general, the optimal policy of the group will be di¢ cult to maintain, because this
maintenance will be a source of problems. Thus, let us adopt the point of view
that inside each group, e¤ort/money is supplied on a voluntary basis.
Let us present a model of a contest between two groups. The extension to more
groups is straightforward from the formal point of view and not very relevant given
that most conicts in real life involve only two groups.
Let us add the following items to the previous notation. There are two groups
denoted by G1 and G2 with n1 and n2 members respectively. Total e¤ort exercised
by members of the rst group will be denoted by X  Pi2G1 Gi: Similarly, let
the total e¤ort made by the members of the second group be denoted by Y P
j2G2 Gj: The probability that group 1 wins the contest is denoted by p(X;Y )
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where p( ) is increasing onX. Payo¤s for an agent of group 1, say i, and an agent of
group 2, say j, are i = p(X; Y )Vi   Ci(Gi) and j = (1  p(X; Y ))Vj   Cj(Gj).
As before, a Nash equilibrium is a list of e¤orts such that each agent chooses
e¤ort to maximize her payo¤s given the e¤orts decided by other agents, inside
and outside her group. Let X and Y  be the Nash equilibrium values of X
and Y . We will not be concerned with existence or uniqueness of equilibrium
(similar assumptions to those used before will do the job). Instead we will be
concerned with the properties of equilibrium. These will be derived from rst
order conditions of payo¤ maximization that for active agents read:
@p(X; Y )
@X
Vi = C
0
i(G

i ); i 2 G1 and  
@p(X; Y )
@Y
Vj = C
0
j(G

j); j 2 G2: (4.7)
In a classic contribution, Mancur Olson (1965) asserted that the free rider prob-
lem inside large groups is so acute that, in equilibrium, large groups exert less
aggregate e¤ort than small groups, which explains the success of the latter. We
will examine his conjecture in the framework of our model.
We easily see in (4.7) that if costs are linear, X and Y  do not depend on the
number of agents inside each group. So, let us assume that C 00r > 0; for all r 2 N:
We have seen that e¤orts in equilibrium depend on valuations and costs. So, in
order to isolate the e¤ect of the number of individuals in each group let us assume
that valuations and cost functions are identical, denoted by V and C( ). From
(4.7) it is clear that equilibrium is symmetric inside each group, so Gi = X
=n1
8i 2 G1 and Gj = Y =n2 8j 2 G2. Hence (4.7) can be written as
@p(X; Y )
@X
V = C 0(
X
n1
) and   @p(X
; Y )
@Y
V = C 0(
Y 
n2
) (4.8)
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Now we have the following:
Proposition 4.3: Assume (H), identical valuations and costs and C 00 > 0:
Then n1 > n2 implies X > Y  and Gi < G

j 8i 2 G1 and 8j 2 G2.
Proof: Suppose that X  Y  and n1 > n2. Then, X=n1 < Y =n2 and given
that C 0( ) is increasing C 0(X=n1) < C 0(Y =n2). From (4.8) we get that
@p(X; Y )
@X
<  @p(X
; Y )
@Y
From (H), p( ) increasing in X and X  Y  we get that
@p(X; Y )
@X
X =  @p(X
; Y )
@Y
Y  ) @p(X
; Y )
@X
  @p(X
; Y )
@Y
which contradicts the equation above. Thus X > Y .
Let us now prove the result regarding individual e¤orts. From (H) and X >
Y  using (4.8) we obtain that
C 0(
X
n1
) =
@p(X; Y )
@X
V <  @p(X
; Y )
@Y
V = C 0(
Y 
n2
)
which given that C 0( ) is increasing, implies the desired result.
Proposition 4.3 is due to Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990), see also Nti
(1998). The conclusion is that, contrary to Olsons conjecture, the success of
small groups cannot be traced to the larger e¤ort made by their members. Our
theory predicts that success in a contest is explained by large valuations, small
costs or contest success functions that favor certain agents, see the discussion
after Proposition 4.1. Esteban and Ray (2001) o¤er an interesting twist to the
previous argument -and a partial vindication of Olsons conjecture- by assuming
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that Vi = V=ni ; where 0    1: When  = 0 the object is a pure public good
-which is the case considered before- and when  = 1 the object is a pure private
good. Thus  is a measure of congestion ranging from no congestion -when the
value of the prize is independent of the number of people in the winning group-
to total congestion, where the private value of the prize is measured on a per
capita basis. An example of the rst is a law, and an example of the second is a
monetary prize. Notice that, except when  = 0, the smaller the group the larger
the prize and -as the theory developed so far suggests- the larger the e¤ort. Thus,
this private good aspect of the prize generates a counterbalancing force to the one
studied in the previous proposition. Esteban and Ray provided the conditions for
this private good aspect to be strong enough to overcome the previous result.
Proposition 4.4: Assume (H) and Ci = cG

i with   1: Then, the smaller
group makes more e¤ort than the larger group if and only if + 1 > .
Proof: First order condition of prot maximization read
@p(X; Y )
@X
V1 = c(
X
n1
) 1 and   @p(X
; Y )
@Y
V2 = c(
Y 
n2
) 1:
From the equations above and (H) we get that
V1Y

V2X
=
(X

n1
) 1
(Y

n2
) 1
:
Taking into account that Vi = V=ni the equation above reads
n2Y

n1X
 =
(X

n1
) 1
(Y

n2
) 1
() Y

X
= (
n1
n2
)
 +1
 :
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W.l.o.g. assume that n1 > n2: Then, from the previous equation, X < Y  ()
(n1
n2
)
 +1
 > 1() + 1 >  which proves the rst claim.
Proposition 4.3 corresponds to the case of  = 0 (though under more general
assumptions). In this case the necessary and su¢ cient condition above does not
hold and hence the result. The most favorable case for the Olson conjecture is
when  = 1 (i.e. when the prize is a pure private good) but even in this case costs
cannot have an exponent larger than two (i.e. quadratic). However if the actual
contest is fought by external agents -lawyers, politicians- whose price per unit of
e¤ort is given, the cost function is linear -i.e.  = 1- and Olson conjecture holds
for all values of  except for the extreme case of  = 0.
Notice the key role of the elasticity of costs with respect to e¤ort, . Intuitively,
it is clear that Olsons conjecture cannot hold if costs rise very quickly with e¤ort:
for instance if costs are zero up to a point, say G where they jump to innity, all
agents will make e¤ort G and smaller groups will exert less e¤ort than large ones.
Finally we notice that if the contest success function were symmetric, in the
sense that the group that makes more e¤ort wins the prize with greater probability,
Proposition 4.4 implies that the smaller group has better chances of getting the
prize, if and only if + 1 > .
4.3. Applications:
4.3.1. Litigation
Farmer and Pecorino (1999) compare British and American systems of nancing
legal expenditures. In the American system each party pays its own expenses in
advance. In the British system the loser pays it all. They nd that in the Amer-
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ican system the equilibrium is symmetric, and prior and posterior probabilities
of winning the trial coincide. This is a special case of Proposition 4.2, where we
have seen that the result needs identical ratio of marginal costs/valuation. Under
the British system payo¤s look like
i = pi(G; q)V   (1  pi(G; q))(c(G1) + c(G2))
Computing equilibrium for suitable functional forms we nd that, in general, prior
and posterior do not coincide. Thus, the American system appears to be less bi-
asedthan its British counterpart, at least in the case of identical costs/valuations.
4.3.2. Allocation of Rights
Nugent and Sánchez (1989) discuss the conict in Spain between migrant shep-
herds -organized in a syndicate called La Mesta- and agricultural settlers during
the Middle Ages and beyond. The conict involved the right of way and pasture
of the shepherd. The Spanish crown systematically favored shepherds. Some his-
torians link the decadence of Spain to this policy. Nugent and Sánchez (see also
Ekelund, Street and Tollison [1997]) point out that if the allocation of way and
pasture rights were a contest, the agent with the highest valuation spends more
money and wins the contest with the highest probability, see our comments below
(4.5). Indeed, it turns out that La Mesta channelled large quantities of gold into
royal pockets. Thus, it can be argued that value added by shepherds was larger
than the value added by agriculture and that the crown pursued the right policy.16
16This can be objected on two counts. First, the outcome may reect the superior organization
of shepherds with respect to farmers. Second, for reasons of their inmediate needs, kings may
have not taken into account the long run negative e¤ect of shepherding on the environment.
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4.3.3. Insurrections and Conicts
Sanchez-Pages (2006) has provided a twist to the argument against the futility
of conicts. He shows that conict can enhance e¢ ciency in the long run. The
reason is that if current holders use a resource ine¢ ciently -e.g. they over-exploit
a natural resource- a group that would manage the resource more e¢ ciently may
have incentives to promote a conict with current owners. From their point of
view, conict pays o¤ because its costs are overcomed by the value of the resource
and the high probability of winning as a consequence of the latter, see (4.6) above.
Grossman (1991) has modeled insurrections as a contest where the probability
of a revolution depends on the military might of the group in power and the
number of insurrect. The former is nanced by a tax paid by peasants. They can
choose between joining the insurrection or staying as peasants. There is free entry,
so in equilibrium, payo¤s obtained in both activities must be equal. The group
in power chooses the tax rate in order to maximize the probability of staying in
power. The basic trade-o¤ for the incumbent ruler is that high (resp. low) taxes
allow for a powerful (resp. weak) army but they do (resp. do not) give incentives
for insurrection because they lower (resp. raise) payo¤s of peasants.
4.3.4. Divisionalized Firms
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) studied rent-seeking in divisionalized rms. In these
rms many decisions, like pricing, are taken by the managers of divisions and only
long run decisions, like the internal allocation of capital, are taken by a central
manager. Suppose that the internal allocation of capital depends on the rent-
seeking activities made by the managers of divisions. Managers make e¤ort in
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rent seeking and a productive activity. For simplicity, assume that the marginal
net return of the latter, denoted by i; is exogenous. E¢ cient divisions have
higher is. The rational use of e¤ort by the manager of division i is to equalize
the marginal return of e¤ort in both rent-seeking and productive activities, i.e.
@i
@yi
=
P
j 6=i yj
(
Pm
j=1 yj)
2
  d = i; or
P
j 6=i yj
(
Pm
j=1 yj)
2
= i + d  di: (4.9)
Equilibrium is identical to that in Proposition 4.1. Notice that (4.9) implies that
managers with higher productivity have a higher cost of rent-seeking. Thus, if pi
is the fraction of funds allocated by the centre, divisions with high productivity
receive fewers funds than those with low productivity, see (4.5). This points to a
disturbing conclusion: In organizations where internal allocation of a resource is
made by rent-seeking, productive agents will obtain less than unproductive ones.
4.4. Rent-Seeking, Institutions and Economic Performance
Suppose that there are two sectors: rent-seeking and production of a socially
valuable item. Rent-seekers preyon producers by stealing, imposing taxes, etc.
A free entry condition -which we have encountered in previous sections- determines
the number of agents in each sector. Papers in this area di¤er in the mechanism
of prey and fall into three categories.
1: Random Encounters with Bandits: Agents either produce a good or to
steal those producing the good. The latter will be called bandits but they also
could be interpreted as corrupted civil servants. Any producer may encounter a
bandit in which case she looses a xed part of her output. Let q be the proportion
of bandits in the population. Expected returns of a producer, denoted by RP ,
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are a decreasing function of q because when bandits are a few (resp. many) the
probability of encounter one of them is low (resp. high). Expected returns to a
bandit, denoted by RB, are also a decreasing function of q because when there are
many (resp. few) producers it is easy (resp. di¢ cult) to nd one. The proportion
of bandits is in equilibrium when RP = RB. It is not di¢ cult to obtain multiple
equilibria because both functions have negative slope with respect to q (Acemoglu
[1995]). Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny [1991] showed that if talent is necessary
for growth an economy can be trapped in a low growth path in which talented
individuals work in rent-seeking activities. In these models two economies with
the same basic data can be in equilibria that are very far apart.
These models formalize the idea that an economy may get into a poverty trap
in which rent-seeking is determined by economic fundamentals. However, they
imply that there is nothing virtuous in rich economies -e.g. Northern European
countries- and nothing wrong in poor ones -Sub-Saharan countries. In fact all
countries are essentially identical. It is simply a matter of being lucky or unlucky.
2: Institutional Rent-Seeking: The previous model does not pay su¢ cient
attention to the question of institutions that make Northern European and Sub-
Saharan countries so di¤erent. The background of the previous model is one of a
weak government but this is not modelled. In contrast, the literature here empha-
sizes the connection between institutions, rent-seeking and economic performance.
North and Weingast (1989) discuss the events surrounding the Glorious Revo-
lution in Great Britain in 1688. They argue that under absolute monarchy, it was
very likely... that the sovereign will alter property rights for his... own benet
(id. p. 803). The methods were taxes unapproved by the Parliament, unpaid
loans, sale of monopoly and peerage, purveyance or simply seizure. All these pro-
32
moted rent-seeking activities that diverted potentially useful talents away from
productive business. With a Parliament dominated by ... wealth holders, its in-
creased role markedly reduced the kings ability to renege(id. p. 804). Countries
in which the Parliament was not strong, ... such as early modern Spain, created
economic conditions that retarded long-run growth(id, p. 808).17
3: Governance and Rent-Seeking: There is little doubt that in the case of
seventeenth century Britain, Parliament played a prominent role in providing the
basis for a sound economic performance. But according to Buchanan and Tullock
(1962) and Olson (1982), parliaments can foster rent-seeking activities. Also,
casual empiricism suggests that countries that experienced no institutional change
dramatically altered their growth rates: Spain (1950-9 vs. 1960-74), India (1950-
92 vs. 1993-2005) and China, (1950-75 vs. 1976-2005).18 In these cases the policies
pursued in the contrasting periods were very di¤erent but the basic institutions
remained practically the same.19 In other words, institutions do not determine
policies univocally. This point has been made by Glaezer, La Porta, López de
Silanes and Shleifer (2004). They examine the existing empirical evidence and nd
little impact by institutions per se but a large impact by policies. See Gradstein
(2004) for a dynamic model of evolution of a particular policy, namely that of
protection of property rights.
17The question is why the Parliament ... would not then proceed to act just like the king?
(id. p. 817). On the one hand the coordination necessary for this made .... rent-seeking activity
on the part of both monarch and merchants more costly(Ekelund and Tollinson [1981]). On
the other hand, the legislative changes introduced by the Glorious Revolution made rent-seeking
very di¢ cult. Judges were elected from among prominent local people who had little incentive
to punish those locals who deed monopoly laws selling goods at cheaper prices (Tullock [1992]).
18Despite the similar experiences in terms of growth, these countries were politically very dif-
ferent: Spain was a right-wing dictatorship, India a democracy and China a left-wing dictatorship
19The change in the growth rate was so sudden and permanent that these cases cast doubts
on the theories of growth based on human capital.
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Corchón (2007) o¤ers a model where the connection between institutions and
policies is explicitly addressed. There are two possible institutions: Autocracy
where taxes are set by the king and Parliament rule where taxes are decided by
majority voting. Productive agents are taxed in order to nance the rent-seeking
activities. Under parliament rule there is an equilibrium in which there are no
rent-seekers. This equilibrium captures the idea that the Parliament wips out
rent-seekers. Unfortunately under not implausible assumptions there is another
equilibrium in which the Parliament is dominated by rent-seekers and the tax
rate is identical to that under absolute monarchy. In this equilibrium the size of
rent-seeking is larger than under autocracy. This cast doubts on the idea that
"right" institutions necessarily promote good economic performance. Finally, it
is shown that rent-seekers may be interested in overthrowing autocracy.20
5. Social Welfare Under Rent-Seeking
In this section we provide a new look to two well-known problems: Welfare losses
under monopoly and the Coase theorem with transaction costs. If property rights
are undened we have contests for monopoly and property rights. We show that
classical welfare analysis is misleading because it does not consider the welfare loss
due to this contest. We will see that these welfare losses may overwhelm welfare
losses arising from standard misallocation.
20This conclusion can be applied to the process of decolonization and suggests a reason for
local rent-seekers to ght against colonial powers.
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5.1. The ght for a Monopoly Right
Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974) pointed out that we have two kind of welfare
losses associated with a distortion such as a monopoly, tari¤s, quotas, etc. On the
one hand the classical ones, measured by the welfare loss of the distortion. But
once the prize is created there is a contest in which agents ght over it. This ght
is costly and this cost must be added to the classical welfare loss in order to get
a fair picture of the total costs produced by the distortion. This is of practical
importance given the low estimates of welfare losses associated with monopoly
that were found by Harberger (1950) and many subsequent papers.
We will present a simple example that highlights this point and generalizes
results obtained by Posner (1975). We assume that in a market there is a single
consumer with a utility function
U = a^x  b
+ 1
x+1   px, with a^  0; b > 0 and  >  1:
x and p are the output and the market price of the good.21 The consumer max-
imizes utility taking p as given. Since @
2U
@x2
=  bx 1 < 0, utility is concave on
output. Thus, the rst order condition of utility maximization yields the inverse
demand function, namely p = a^  bx: If b > 0 and  = 1 this function is linear.
If a^ = 0, b < 0 and  < 0 this function is isoelastic:
The Monopolist produces under constant marginal costs, denoted by k. Let
a  a^   k. The monopolist prot function reads  = (a   bx)x. This function
21 is a measure of the curvature of demand function (inverse demand is concave i¤   1).
b is an inverse measure of the size of the market since the maximum welfare is obtained when
x = ((a^  t)=b) 1 ). The slope of the demand function is determined by the sign of  b and thus,
it is negative.
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is concave because @
2
@x2
=  bx 1( + 1) < 0: The rst order condition of prot
maximization yields the monopolist output and prots, namely
xE = (
a
b(1 + )
)
1
 and  = (
a
b(+ 1)
)
1

a
+ 1
:
The socially optimal allocation is found by maximizing social welfare dened as
the sum of consumer and producer surpluses, i.e.
W = U +  = a^x  b
+ 1
x+1   kx = ax  b
+ 1
x+1
This function is concave because @
2W
@x2
=  bx 1 < 0. The rst order condition
of welfare maximization yields the optimal output
xO = (
a
b
)
1
 :
Evaluating social welfare in the optimum (W o) and the equilibrium allocations
(WE) we obtain that
W 0 = (
a
b
)
1

a
1 + 
and WE = (
a
b(1 + )
)
1

a(2 + )
(1 + )2
Denoting by RM the relative welfare loss due to misallocation in the market of
the good, we have that
RM  W
O  WE
WO
= 1  ( 1
1 + 
)
1

2 + 
1 + 
:
The dotted line in Figure 1 below plots the values of RM as a function of . For
instance, for values of  = 1 (the case analyzed by Posner [1975]) or  =  :5,
36
RM = :25. See Hillman and Katz (1984) for the case of risk averse agents where
risk aversion lowers e¤orts and welfare losses.
If the monopoly right is subject to rent-seeking, agents incur on unproduc-
tive expenses in order to obtain the prize. Assuming that rents are completely
dissipated in wasted e¤ort -recall our discussion in Section 2- prots equal un-
productive expenses and thus become a welfare loss as well. Graphically, instead
of the classical triangle -as in Harberger- welfare loss becomes a trapezoid -the
so-called Tullocks trapezoid. Denoting the relative welfare loss by R we have that
R =
 +WO  WE
WO
:
Notice that
 =
WO  WE
(1 + )
1
   +2
+1
:
Manipulating the previous expressions we obtain the following:
Proposition 5.1: In the example above and assuming complete wasteful rent
dissipation, relative welfare loss associated with monopoly is
R = (1  ( 1
1 + 
)
1

2 + 
1 + 
)(
(1 + )
1
   1
+1
(1 + )
1
   +2
+1
):
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The solid line in Figure 1 above plots R as a function of . For  = 1 or
 =  :5 welfare loss becomes, respectively, three times or twice the magnitude
predicted by the classical theory. When  ! 1 relative welfare loss approaches
one but the relative welfare loss due to misallocation of resources approaches
zero! However, recall that rent-dissipation is by no means a general result. These
calculations only illustrate the point that the classical theory may underestimate
the magnitude of welfare losses.
5.2. The Coase Theorem
Coase (1960), states that with well dened property rights and zero transaction
costs, private and social costs will be equal(Coase [1988], p. 158). This result
though, masks the ght for the property rights that may result in a wasteful
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conict (Jung, Krutilla, Viscusi and Boyd [1995]). For instance, suppose that
two contenders ght for a property right that they value in v1 and v2 respectively
with v1 > v2. After the property right has been allocated, agents can trade
with probability r. r is an inverse measure of transaction costs that preclude a
mutually benecial transaction. There are two outcomes: In the rst, agent 1 gets
the property right and no trade results: Payo¤s are (v1; 0). In the second, agent 2
gets the property right and with probability r sells the object to agent 1 for a price
of v1+v2
2
.22 In this case expected payo¤s are (r v1 v2
2
; r v1+v2
2
+ (1  r)v2). Suppose
that agents can inuence the allocation of the right by incurring expenses G1 and
G2. Denoting by p1 the probability that agent 1 obtains the property right,
1 = p1v1 + (1  p1)rv1   v2
2
  c(G1)
2 = (1  p1)(rv1 + v2
2
+ (1  r)v2)  c(G2)
Setting V1  v1   r v1 v22 and V2  r v1+v22 + (1  r)v2 the previous equations read
1 = p1V1 + r
v1   v2
2
  c(G1)
2 = (1  p1)V2   c(G2)
Since agents take r as given the rst payo¤ function is strategically equivalent to
p1V1   c(G1). Suppose now that the contest probability function is like in (1.1)
and that c(Gi) = Gi. Then, the conditions of Proposition 4.1 are met and in
22This corresponds to the so-called standard solution in bargaining theory, see Mas-Colell,
Whinston and Green (1995), p. 846. For an analysis of the welfare losses yielded by di¤erent
bargaining rules see Anbarci, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002).
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equilibrium, from (4.3)
Gi =
V 2i Vj
(V1 + V2)2
and pi =
Vi
(V1 + V2)
; i 6= j = 1; 2:
If rent-seeking expenses are totally wasteful the total expected welfare loss is
WL =
V1V2
V1 + V2
+ (1  r)(v1   v2)(1  p1):
Notice that for v1 = v2 = v, say, the welfare loss due to transaction costs goes
to zero but the welfare loss due to rent-seeking goes to v=2. Again the classical
approach hides what might be the most signicant welfare loss. But this is not
the end of it. Since V1 and V2 are functions of r, WL can be written as WL(r).
We easily see that
WL(0) =
v1v2
v1 + v2
+ (v1   v2) v2
v1 + v2
and WL(1) =
v1 + v2
4
:
We see that when v2 ' 0, WL(1) is larger than WL(0), i.e. welfare loss can
increase when transaction costs decrease, a complete reverse of what the classical
approach asserts. This reversion is due to the fact that a decrease in transaction
costs may exacerbate the contest for the object and, thus, rent-seeking expenses.
Formally,
Proposition 5.2: For some values of v1 and v2: a) The welfare loss associ-
ated with transaction costs tends to zero (i.e. when v1 ! v2) but the welfare losses
due to rent-seeking can be arbitrarily large (i.e. when v1 !1 and v2 !1). b)
Total welfare loss may increase when transaction costs decrease.
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6. The Design of Optimal Contests
This section may sound paradoxical since many contests are totally wasteful be-
cause nothing socially valuable is produced (e.g. Examples 1.2-3 or the two cases
considered in the previous section). In this case the best course from the social
welfare point of view is to forfeit the contest. However we have seen that in other
cases contenders produce something valuable for society (e.g. Examples 1.4-5-
6).23 Moreover certain parameters of the contest can be chosen prior to the actual
contest is played: For instance in the case of selecting a host city for the Olympic
Games, the Olympic Committee controls, at least to some extent, the form of the
contest success functions and the number of contenders. Thus, the question of
how the contest should be organized is a meaningful one.
6.1. Social Objectives
Let us concentrate our attention on contests in which something valuable is pro-
duced. First, we must have a criterion by means of which the planner ranks the
results in the contest. We have two classes of agents. On the one hand we have
those that consume the prize and on the other hand we have those that partici-
pate in the contest. Following the example of the Olympic Games we will assume
that consumers only care about the quality of the winner. This assumption is also
reasonable in other cases, such as scientic or artistic prizes, etc. Following the in-
terpretation given before, we assume that i(Gi) measures the excellency/quality
of the winner. Therefore, the expected excellence of the winner when m agents
23In some cases, rent-seeking might increase social welfare if it diverts e¤orts from industries
where there is too much e¤ort (e.g. an industry characterized by negative externalities).
41
make e¤orts of (G1; ::::; Gm) is
Pm
i=1 pi(G)i(Gi): The payo¤s obtained by con-
tenders are
Pm
j=1 pi(G)Vi(G)  
Pm
j=1C(Gj): We will assume the social welfare
function is
W = 
mX
i=1
pi(G)i(Gi) + (1  )(
mX
j=1
pi(G)Vi(G) 
mX
j=1
C(Gj));  2 [0; 1] (6.1)
where  can be interpreted as the proportion between consumers and contenders.
Notice that this social welfare function neither gives any weight to the quality
of the losers -who could add prestige to the contest- nor embodies any distrib-
utional target. These are important points that we will ignore for the sake of
simplicity. The case in which e¤ort does not have a social merit -recall Example
1.2- can be dealt with by setting  = 0.
6.2. Properties of the Socially Optimal Contests
In this section we will assume A1, identical agents and that the optimum is sym-
metric. Denoting by y the common value of the e¤orts/investments (6.1) becomes
W = (y) + (1  )(V0 + an(y)  nC(y)): (6.2)
To nd the optimal contest we choose ( ) and n in order to maximize W with
the restriction that e¤orts are those made in a Nash equilibrium of the contest. In
the case in which we only choose the number of contenders, we know that under
A1 for each n we have a unique Nash equilibrium. We represent this by means of
the function y = y(n) which summarizes the restriction faced by the planner.
In this subsection and the next we will be concerned with the case in which
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 = 1: This case may be a good approximation to a situation where the number of
consumers is very large in relation to the number of contenders, as in the example
of the Olympic Games. An implication of this assumption is that in the symmetric
case optimality requires maximizing the e¤ort per agent y:
First, let us look at the case in which the planner can choose the contest success
function. Let us assume that this function is parametrized by a real number 
which belongs to an interval [; ]: Hence, the function ( ) is now written (Gi; ).
We now assume that  a¤ects ( ) in the following way:
@(Gi; )
@Gi
Gi
(Gi; )
is increasing in : (6.3)
(6.3) means that  raises the elasticity of ( ) with respect to Gi. For instance,
if (Gi; ) = G

i ;  2 [0; 1]; we have that @(Gi;)@Gi Gi(Gi;) = : Hence (6.3) holds:
Proposition 6.1: Under A1, (6.3) and a = 0, the optimal contest is  = :
Proof: Under our assumptions (3.4) reads
@(y; )
@Gi
V0(n  1)
(y; )n2
  C 0(y) = 0:
Denote the left hand side of the previous equation by 	(y; ): 	( ) is decreasing in
y (because ( ) is increasing and concave in y) and increasing in  (by (6.3)): Since
the right hand side of the above equation is non decreasing in y; di¤erentiating
implicitly we obtain that
dy
d
=
@	(y;)
@
d2C(y)
dy2
  @	(y;)
@y
> 0:
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Hence y is maximized with the largest value of :
To get a feeling for the previous result let us go back to the case where
(Gi; ) = G

i : Here,  measures how the probability of getting the prize re-
sponds to e¤orts, for instance if  = 0, this probability does not depend on the
e¤orts. Thus, if we want to give incentives to agents to make the greatest e¤ort
possible, we must choose the largest . In this case this yields a linear ( ) (Das-
gupta and Nti (1998) also proved -in a di¤erent context- that linear functions are
optimal). However, in other cases a larger value of  is optimal, provided that an
equilibrium can be guaranteed.
Suppose now that the planner can choose the number of active contenders:
Remark 6.1. Under A1 the optimal number of active contenders is two.
Proof: Maximizing (y) amounts to maximizing y which, according to Propo-
sition 3.2, amounts to minimizing n: 24
The interpretation of this result is that competition is bad because it yields
a low level of e¤ort by the winner but monopoly is even worse because it yields
no e¤ort. Thus the optimal policy consists in choosing the smaller number of
contenders.25 This result may help to explain why in many sports nals are played
by two teams or why the USA defence department chose two rms to compete
in the so-called Joint Strike Fighter eliminating McDonell-Douglas which was the
third contender. It could also be used to explain the so-called Dual Sourcing in
which a rm demanding equipment chooses two companies as possible suppliers
24An example where this result holds for  6= 1 is available from the author under request:
See Chung (1996) for the case a 6= 0:
25Other examples in which an increase of competition may harm social welfare are markets
with economies of scale (von Weizacker [1980]) or with moral hazard (Scharsftein [1988]).
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(Shapiro and Varian (1999), pp.. 124-5).
This result does not hold when agents are either heterogeneous or when they
have a di¤erent valuation for their own e¤ort than for other peoples. An example
of the second situation is available under request from the author. Here there is
an example of what may happen when agents are heterogeneous.
Example 6.1: Assume n = 3 with V1 = V2 = V3 = 1; c1 = :2, c2 = 1 and
c3 = 1. Social welfare is W =
Pm
i=1G

i p

i . NE when there are only two agents is
p1 = :83; p

2 = :17; G

1 = :7; G

2 = :14; with W
= :6048: NE with three agents is
p1 = :82; p

2 = :09; p

3 = :09; G

1 = :745; G

2 = :08; G

3 = :08, with W
=:62:
The key to this example lies in the slope of best reply functions: If agent i is
very e¢ cient, i.e. she has a small ci, her strategy increases with the strategies of
the rest (strategic complementarity). Conversely, if i is very ine¢ cient, i.e. ci is
large, her strategy decreases with the strategies of the rest (strategic substitution).
The introduction of a third agent increases the e¤ort of the e¢ cient agents and
decreases the e¤ort of ine¢ cient agents which is good from the point of view
of social welfare: In the previous example with two agents
P
j 6=1Gj = :14 andP
j 6=2Gj = :7; but with three agents
P
j 6=1Gj = :16 and
P
j 6=2Gj = :825, i.e. the
introduction of a third agent increases G1 and decreases G

2:
We now turn our attention to the question posed by the statistician Francis
Galton in 1902 regarding the optimal number of prizes. Suppose that there is a
maximum of k prizes with values V 1; V 2; :::; V k: Let M be the maximum amount
of cash that can be spent on prizes, i.e. M Pnl=1 V l. We will also assume that
all agents contend for all prizes (see Moldovanu and Sela [2001] for the case in
which each agent can only receive one prize). Let pli l = 1; 2; :::k be the probability
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that agent i obtains prize l. We will assume that
pli =
GliPn
j=1G
l
j
; where l 2 [0; 1]: (6.4)
The planner has to choose the values V 1; V 2; :::; V k with the restriction M Pn
l=1 V
l and taken as given n and l; l = 1; 2; :::; k: Let M  maxl=1;::::;k(l) and
m  minl=1;::::;k(l) be respectively the maximum and the minimum values of l.
Proposition 6.3: Assume A1a) and (6.4). If M = m any number of prizes
is optimal. If M > m, the optimal number of prizes is one, namely prize M .
Proof: The rst order condition of payo¤ maximization is
1G1 1i
P
j 6=iG
1
j
(
Pn
j=1G
1
j )
2
V 1 +
2G2 1i
P
j 6=iG
2
j
(
Pn
j=1G
2
j )
2
V 2 + :::+
kGk 1i
P
j 6=iG
k
j
(
Pn
j=1G
k
j )
2
V k = C 0(Gi)
Using methods like those used in Propositions 3.1 and 4.1 it can be shown that the
second order condition holds and that there are no asymmetric equilibria. Thus,
the previous equation can be re-written as
1(n  1)V 1
n2
+
2(n  1)V 2
n2
+ :::+
k(n  1)V k
n2
= yC 0(y)  
(y)
This equation yields the unique Nash equilibrium because 
( ) is strictly increasing
and can be inverted, hence,
y = 
 1(
(n  1)
n2
kX
l=1
V ll):
Maximizing y yields the result:
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The interpretation of this result lies in the fact that l0s measure how the
probability of getting the prize responds to e¤orts: If the planner wants to give
incentives to agents to exert e¤ort, she should choose the larger value of l.
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